Abstract In this article, I examine voting patterns in origin and receiving country national elections among immigrants in
thereby fostering transnational linkages between origin and receiving societies (Boccagni 2011; Boccagni et al. 2015; Collyer 2014; Erdal and Oeppen 2013; Vertovec 2004; Waldinger 2015) . 1 Consequently, existing scholarship documents how immigrants and diasporas engage from afar with the political landscapes of their homelands (Boccagni et al. 2015; Koinova 2013; Lafleur 2013 Lafleur , 2015 . Within the transnationalism research lexicon, an important line of enquiry explores the notion of 'dual loyalties' and the relationship between immigrant integration and transnational political engagement (DeSipio 2006; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Morales and Pilati 2014; Waldinger 2008, Waldinger and Soehl 2013) . Yet, few studies specifically analyse the relationship between immigrant voting behaviour in the receiving and origin country (an exception is Morales and Morariu 2011) . To address this gap in the literature, I use cross-national survey data to analyse whether immigrant political participation in the receiving society increases or decreases the odds of voting in homeland elections. The existing scholarship on the relationship between immigrant incorporation and transnationalism focuses on how individual resources and contextual conditions in receiving societies shape an immigrant's propensity to engage in transnational politics. I organize this literature into two competing perspectives on transnational politicsresocialization and complementarity. The resocialization perspective suggests that immigrants undergo a process of political resocialization after arriving in a new receiving society, which ultimately weakens transnational political practices over time and in later generations (Itzigsohn 2009; Soehl and Waldinger 2012; Waldinger 2015) . The complementarity perspective suggests that successful socioeconomic incorporation and inclusive contexts of reception increase an immigrant's proclivity to engage in transnational politics with their countries of origin (Guarnizo et al. 2003; Levitt 2001; Portes et al. 2002) . Hence, existing empirical and theoretical insights are inconclusive about the nature of the relationship between immigrant incorporation and transnational engagement. The main convergence between the two perspectives is a shared recognition that only a small minority of immigrants engage in transnational politics (Guarnizo et al. 2003; Lafleur 2015; Waldinger 2008 Waldinger , 2015 . While both perspectives reveal important insights into the processes of immigrant integration and transnational politics, existing research suffers from three limitations.
First, since the research has largely conceptualized immigrant incorporation as acculturation and socioeconomic mobility rather than as receiving-country-oriented civic and political participation (Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Guarnizo et al. 2003) , few studies analyse the specific relationship between voting behaviour in the receiving and origin country. Second, while existing literature acknowledges how contexts of reception and political opportunity structures in host societies shape immigrant transnational politics and political claims-making (Boccagni 2011; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Koopmans et al. 2005; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003) , few studies examine how origincountry contexts may also shape an immigrant's homeland-oriented political engagement. 2 Finally, much of the theory on immigrant transnationalism is derived from empirical studies focusing on the transnational political practices of Latin American immigrants in the United States Guarnizo and Diaz 1999; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008; Levitt 2001; Waldinger 2008; Waldinger and Soehl 2013) . 3 As Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) pointed out, this singular empirical focus on the US experience may diminish the generalizability of existing theoretical perspectives when applied to other immigrant groups in Europe. I address these limitations by looking at the relationship between receiving and origincountry voting behaviour among twelve groups of immigrants residing in Europe, thereby testing the applicability of the resocialization and complementarity perspectives.
The following questions guide the analysis. (1) What is the nature of the relationship between immigrant voting in receiving and origin countries? (2) How do contextual factors in receiving and origin countries shape an immigrant's likelihood of voting in homeland elections? The data come from a study by entitled Multicultural democracy and immigrants' social capital in Europe: participation, organizational networks and public policies at the local level (LOCALMULTIDEM), which offers city-level survey data on immigrant voting behaviour in receiving and origin societies for twelve immigrant groups across seven European cities, spanning five European receiving countries. The findings yield mixed results for both perspectives. As time spent in the receiving country increases, the odds of voting in the most recent elections in the country of origin decreases, as the resocialization perspective predicted. However, immigrants who voted in the most recent elections in the receiving country were more likely to have voted in the most recent elections in their country of origin. In addition, the findings suggest that individual resources and origin-country contexts explain more of the variation in immigrant voting in the country of origin than conventional emphases on receiving-country contexts. In other words, having accounted for the context in the country of origin, national and local-level integration policies and political opportunity structures in the host society appear to have no effect on an immigrant's propensity to vote in the homeland. In sum, a combination of individual resources, coupled with origin-country contexts and political and civic participation in the receiving country, appear to increase immigrant proclivities to engage in politics 'here' and 'there'.
The resocialization and complementarity perspectives of transnational political engagement
Research on political transnationalism reveals myriad ways in which resourceful immigrants engage in cross-border politics (Kastoryano and Schader 2014) . Within this literature, researchers analyse the determinants of immigrant transnational political engagement and the contextual conditions that foster or constrain immigrants' crossborder political activities. For instance, several studies show how immigrants engage in the electoral politics of their countries of origin (Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Escobar et al. 2015; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Lafelur 2013; Morales and Pilati 2014; Waldinger 2015) . Concomitantly, other research documents how changing institutional contexts in origin and receiving societies enable immigrants to engage in transnational politics through policies such as dual citizenship and external voting (Bauböck 2003; Collyer 2014; Délano and Gamlen 2014; Gamlen 2008 ). In addition, by analysing the relationship between immigrants' socioeconomic integration into their receiving societies and their homeland oriented transnational political engagement, some studies seek to understand transnational practices vis-à-vis immigrant incorporation (DeSipio 2006; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Morales and Pilati 2014; Portes et al. 2002; Waldinger 2008 Waldinger , 2015 . This last line of enquiry is pertinent to the present analysis because it is this scholarship that has produced the competing perspectives of resocialization and complementarity.
The resocialization perspective contends that most immigrants undergo political resocialization after arriving in the receiving country and that this decreases their transnational political engagement over time and in later generations (Itzigsohn 2009; Morawska 2014; Soehl and Waldinger 2012; Waldinger 2015) . That is, following their arrival in a new receiving society, immigrants tend to loosen their political loyalties to their homelands in order to acculturate and integrate successfully into the socioeconomic, political and civic life of the receiving society. A way of testing this hypothesis is to examine whether transnational homeland-oriented political engagement declines after the immigrants' arrival in a receiving society and between first and later generations. For instance, empirical research on Mexican immigrants in the USA shows that both political interest and active engagement in Mexican politics decreases over time and in the second generation (Waldinger 2015; Waldinger and Soehl 2013) . Similarly, in the case of Ecuadorian migrants in Europe, Morales and Pilati (2014) find that transnational political engagement is more likely among recent arrivals who have not yet undergone stable incorporation into the host society, suggesting that homelandoriented political activity declines as immigrants become socialized into the receiving society. Following this logic, I hypothesize that: H1: As time spent in the receiving country increases and immigrants undergo political and civic incorporation, the odds of voting in the country of origin decrease.
Alternatively, the complementarity perspective predicts that immigrants undergoing civic and political incorporation coupled with socioeconomic mobility in their new receiving societies are more likely to engage transnationally with homeland politics. Challenging the notion that transnationalism encourages 'dual loyalties', a number of studies suggest that socioeconomic assimilation and transnational political engagement are complementary processes (Fernández-Kelly 2015; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Levitt 2001; Levitt and Schiller 2004) . Empirical research on the transnational political engagement of Latin American immigrants in the USA reveals how a minority of highly educated immigrants with substantial resources has the highest probability of engaging in transnational politics (Guarnizo et al. 2003) . Socioeconomic mobility and successful integration also have a positive association with other types of transnational engagement, including entrepreneurship (Portes et al. 2002) and participation in transnational immigrant organizations (Chaudhary and Guarnizo 2016) . Thus, following the logic of the complementarity perspective, I hypothesize that time spent in the receiving society, coupled with civic and political incorporation, increases immigrants' transnational political engagement. H2: As time spent in the receiving country increases and immigrants undergo political and civic incorporation, the odds of voting in the country of origin increase.
Origin and receiving-country contexts
Much of the sociological literature on the transnational political practices of immigrants assumes that a host of individual factors (such as demographics and socioeconomic attainment), as well as the multi-layered social, economic and institutional contexts of the reception, determine political processes and behaviour Levitt and Schiller 2004; Waldinger 2008 Waldinger , 2015 Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004) . Borrowing from the social movements literature (McAdam et al. 1996) , scholars often see the overall context in which transnational political engagement occurs as constituting a political opportunity structure (Kastoryano and Schader 2014; Morales and Pilati 2014) . Political opportunity structures refer here to the relative openness or restrictiveness of national and local policies associated with residency, citizenship, integration policies and access to electoral and civic participation (Arrighi and Bauböck 2016; Bauböck 2003; Morales and Giugni 2011) . Thus, the overall inclusive or restrictive nature of the receiving society's political opportunity structure may influence immigrants' propensity to participate in the political activities of the receiving and/or sending country (Boccagni et al. 2015; Koopmans et al. 2005 ).
More recently, researchers have turned their attention to the role of the country of origin in shaping immigrants' transnational engagement (Boccagni 2014; Collyer 2014; Gamlen 2008 ), for the context in which the migration occurs from is a critical dimension in understanding the nature of migration flows and immigrant integration (Faist 2000; Levitt and Schiller 2004) . For instance, migration from former colonies has created unique patterns and experiences of post-colonial integration in the UK and Spain (Heath et al. 2013; Hierro 2016 ). Accordingly, a few studies focus on how historical and contemporary contexts in the countries of origin shape immigrants' transnational political engagement from afar (Boccagni 2014; Berg and Tamagno 2006; Lafleur 2013; Levitt 2001) . For example, despite the Colombian government's efforts to engage with its diaspora abroad, Colombians are less likely than other Latin American migrants to engage in transnational politics because of the widespread mistrust of and perceived corruption associated with Colombia's political culture (Guarnizo and Chaudhary 2014; . However, alternative studies find that efforts by some Latin American governments to cultivate and integrate their emigrants living abroad may modestly increase transnational political participation among educated immigrants with resources (Escobar 2015; Lafleur 2013 Lafleur , 2015 .
While case studies of experiences of transnational political participation in various countries of origin reveal how certain contextual conditions influence transnational politics, a case-study approach cannot explain why immigrant transnational political engagement might vary across different origin or receiving countries. Moreover, the overemphasis in past research on Mexican and Latin American immigrants in the USA overlooks how contextual variations between different homeland and receiving countries in Europe may challenge prevailing theories and assumptions about immigrant transnational political engagement.
Data and measures
LOCALMULTIDEM ), a comparative study of ethnically stratified city-level survey data collected between 2004 and 2008, provides information on voting behaviour for twelve immigrant groups in seven European cities spanning five European receiving countries. 4 The primary data used in the analysis come from these individual-level surveys. All respondents had resided in each of the survey cities for at least six months and were at least 18 years of age. Immigrant groups used in the analysis originate from a variety of countries, including Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Kosovo, Bangladesh, India, the Philippines, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Ecuador. 5 The key dependent variable used in the analysis measures respondent voting behaviour in the most recent national elections in their country of origin. To the question of 'whether they had voted in the last homeland elections', respondents could choose one of three responses -'not eligible', 'eligible, but did not vote', or 'eligible and voted'. Since the focus of the analysis is on voting behaviour, I removed the respondents who answered, 'not eligible' (N=395), to generate a binary dependent variable. After determining that missing data for variables of interest were missing at random, I removed observations with missing data from the sample, yielding a total sample of (N=2,483). 6 To test these hypotheses, I used a set of key independent variables to measure time spent in the receiving society, as well as civic and political participation. A continuous variable measuring the number of years since the respondent first arrived in the receiving country captured time spent in the receiving country. To ensure that respondents were in fact living abroad during their most recent homeland elections, I removed respondents from the analysis whose first year of arrival was the same year or the year following their last homeland national elections. This was essential because, to investigate transnational political engagement through external voting, respondents needed to be residing outside their countries of origin at the time of the most recent national elections.
Earlier research on immigrant integration operationalizes civic participation as a multidimensional process including citizenship acquisition, as well as voting and participating in voluntary associations or organizations (Bloemraad 2006 , Guarnizo et al. 2003 Heath et al. 2013; Ramakrishnan 2005) . Accordingly, I measured political and civic participation with two dummy variables -(1) whether respondents had acquired citizenship in the receiving country; and (2) whether they belonged to any type of association in the receiving society. While naturalization is not a prerequisite for civic engagement, past research finds a strong correlation between formal citizenship and civic engagement, with naturalized immigrants more likely than non-citizens to vote and participate in voluntary organizations (Bloemraad 2006; Ramakrishnan and Baldassare 2004) . In addition, naturalized citizens are more likely to engage in transnational activities than non-citizens, who lack the protections and entitlements associated with holding citizenship in the receiving society (Guarnizo et al. 2003) . Accordingly, I assumed both citizenship acquisition and associational membership in the receiving country functioned as proxies for immigrants' civic engagement and political incorporation.
I measured electoral political participation in the receiving country with the threecategory variable -'not eligible', 'eligible, but did not vote' and 'eligible and voted' -to measure the respondents' voting behaviour in the receiving country's most recent national elections. Finally, I included conventional individual-level sociodemographic controls such as age, gender, marital status, employment status and educational attainment. Table 1 provides a descriptive overview of all respondents across these variables, while Appendix A provides an overview of the proportion of immigrants who voted in the most recent national elections in both the homeland and receiving countries.
Contextual variation
The receiving cities in the data reflect contextual variation vis-à-vis immigration histories and overall compositions of the immigrant population. These cities include immigrant gateways such as London, Stockholm, Geneva and Zurich, as well as newer cities of immigration such as Milan, Madrid and Barcelona. Cities in which respondents reside also experience different sorts of migration flows. Whereas London, Stockholm, Zurich and Geneva underwent decades of postwar labour migration, Milan, Madrid and Barcelona have only known large-scale immigration flows since the 1990s (Castles et al. 2013 ). In addition, some cities (London, Madrid and Barcelona) contain sizeable populations of post-colonial immigrants, while others (Stockholm, Zurich, Milan and Geneva) have immigrant populations without colonial ties to the receiving societies.
To measure the contextual differences between receiving and homeland countries, I merged the individual-level survey data with aggregate data containing key measures for each country. Receiving-country indicators included two indices, namely immigrant integration policies and opportunity structures. The first provided a national aggregate score for the level of openness and access to institutional politics offered to immigrants. This index of political access is a component of the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which measures the migrant integration policies of all EU member states. It includes 167 policy indicators that offer a multidimensional picture of migrant opportunities to participate in society. The political dimension of MIPEX offers an index for measuring the degree to which receiving countries allow migrants to participate in electoral politics. Political participation here includes whether migrants have the right to vote in national, local, or regional elections, as well as the right to stand for office in local elections. Receiving countries are assigned scores for various policies. The higher the score, the more inclusive and open the access to politics.
I also merge aggregate city-level data from the LOCALMULTIDEM Political Opportunity Structures Indicators Dataset into the individual-level survey data to measure the overall political opportunity structures within respondents' cities of residence. This dataset contains a series of measures providing an overall score for the level of restrictiveness of a local political opportunity structure. Highly restrictive policies obtain a score of (-1) while highly inclusive ones receive a score of (+1). Policies seen as neutral receive a score of (0). Appendix B reports the scores for the MIPEX and LOCALMULTIDEM political opportunity structures data for the receiving cities and countries in the analysis.
To account for the overall effect of homeland contexts on voting behaviour, I replicate earlier research on political transnationalism by using fixed-effect dummy variables to represent the 12 homeland countries (Waldinger 2008) . Since Ecuadorian immigrants are the largest group in the sample, Ecuador serves as the reference category in the analyses. Table 1 and Appendix C offer an overview of the distribution of immigrants in the sample by countries of origin. The use of homeland dummy variables enables me to see which immigrants have a greater or lower probability of voting in their homeland elections. I also included a set of specific homeland indicators, such as whether the country of origin allows external voting from abroad, voter turnout, distance and post-colonial ties. I derived external voting data from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) database on 'Voting from Abroad' and included it as a binary country-level fixed effect. 7 The IDEA database also provides information on voter turnout in homeland elections. Past research suggests that premigration political experiences may motivate some immigrants to remain politically engaged with their homelands from afar . While the data do not provide information on migrants' individual pre-migration voting behaviour, voter turnout in the previous homeland elections may offer some insight into the overall level of political activity in the country of origin. Therefore, I included a fixed effect for voter turnout in the last homeland elections to account for the overall level of electoral participation in the country of origin. Past research suggests former colonial ties may foster shared cultural norms vis-à-vis politics may increase the political participation of post-colonial immigrants (Heath et al. 2013) . To account for the effect of post-colonial ties, I included a dummy variable to control for whether immigrants from former colonies reside within cities of the former colonial power (UK or Spain). I also included a control measure for the distance (km/1000) between the capital cities of migrants' homeland countries and the destination cities in which they resided at the time of the survey. The decision to use homeland capital cities was an imperfect solution to an absence of information on respondents' specific places of origin. Finally, I included an aggregate index for the level of democracy in the country of origin because both transnational and domestic voter turnout are thought to be a partial function of a country's overall level of democratic governance (Blias 2006) . I treat this index, which is from the Polity IV database (Marshall et al. 2014) , as an origin-country fixed-effect.
8 Appendix C offers an overview of the key country of origin indicators.
Findings Table 1 provides a descriptive overview of the respondents in the sample. The average age is 37, the split between men and women (with 45.3 per cent being women) is almost proportion voting in the most recent receiving-country elections, suggesting that they are generally more politically active than many other immigrant groups. Nevertheless, despite the varied patterns of voting behaviour observed here for the homeland and receiving-country elections, the focus of the present analysis is on the determinants and contexts of the hypothesized relationship between political incorporation and transnational political engagement. Moreover, a detailed analysis of receiving-country voting behaviour is beyond the scope of this article. Descriptive data on the key indicators associated with the two hypotheses indicate that the average time immigrants have been in the receiving country ranges from one to 61 years with an average of ten years (see Table 1 ). Regarding civic participation, 14.3 per cent of the respondents had acquired the citizenship of the receiving country and 37.7 per cent are members of an association in the receiving society. Finally, results for political incorporation in the receiving country measured as voting in the last national elections show that most respondents (85.2 per cent) were ineligible to vote. However, of those who were eligible, similar proportions participated and abstained (6.97 per cent voted and 7.81 per cent did not). Again, while eligibility explains why most respondents did not vote, it fails to offer any information on the hypothesized relationship between political and civic participation in the receiving country and voting in the country of origin. Table 1 also presents mean scores for receiving-country contexts as measured by the MIPEX index of access to political participation (55.4) and the average city-level score for the openness and inclusivity of the immigrant specific political opportunity structure (0.12). Specific national MIPEX scores and political opportunity scores for the cities used in the analysis are available in Appendix B. Some 60.4 per cent of the countries of origin in the sample allow external voting and the average voter turnout in the most recent national elections hovered at around 62.6 per cent. The mean level of democratization as measured by the Polity IV index is 4.47, indicating that on average the respondents' countries of origin are slightly less democratic. Appendix C presents the specific Polity scores, as well as other homeland contexts for each of the different countries of origin in the sample. Finally, 41.9 per cent of the respondents fit the category of post-colonial immigrants because they emigrated to and settled within the borders of former colonial powers that had previously ruled over their countries of origin (Spain and Britain). Together, these descriptive results suggest considerable socioeconomic, demographic and contextual variability between respondents, as well as between their places of origin and settlement. Ecuador is reference country for the fixed-effect country dummy variables. Table 2 presents results from logit regression models predicting the log-odds of having voted in the most recent homeland elections. The dependent variable used in each model contains two distinct categories (0=eligible, but did not vote; 1=eligible, did vote). In Model 1, I test both the resocialization and complementarity perspectives by analysing the effects of years since arrival and civic participation, measured as citizenship acquisition and associational membership, on the log-odds of having voted in the last country of origin elections. Model 1 includes a set of socio-demographic controls to account for heterogeneity in the population and two measures for the overall political opportunity structures to account for variation across receiving cities. In Model 2, I add immigrant political participation in the receiving country to test the two perspectives further. Finally, in Models 3 and 4, I introduce two different sets of variables that account for contextual variation across immigrant homeland countries.
Consistent with the resocialization hypothesis (H1) , Model 1 shows that each additional year following the first year of arrival in the receiving country decreases the log-odds of voting in the country of origin (see Model 1, Table 2 ). However, in contrast to H1, the results indicate that civic participation in the form of associational membership in the receiving country is associated with an increase in the odds of having voted in the last homeland elections by 2.22 (exp(0.798)). That is, immigrants who belong to associations in receiving societies are more than twice as likely than those who do not to have voted in the most recent homeland elections. This finding lends support to the complementarity hypothesis (H2), which suggests a positive association between civic participation in the form of associational membership in the receiving country and having voted in the last homeland elections. Concomitantly, individual-level control variables also lend support to H2, indicating that age coupled with resources such as employment and educational attainment appear to increase the log-odds of having voted in the last homeland elections. However, contextual factors in the receiving society suggest an alternative relationship between incorporation and transnational political engagement. Access to political participation at the national level as measured by MIPEX decreases the odds of voting in homeland elections by 1.04 (exp(-0.037)). Similarly, an increase in the inclusivity of the city-level political opportunity structure decreases the odds of homeland voting by 1.71 (exp(-0.535) ). These results suggest that an inclusive context of reception may decrease immigrant transnational political engagement.
Model 2 introduces immigrants' homeland voting behaviour in the most recent national elections to examine the relationship between political integration and voting in the country of origin. While descriptive statistics presented in Appendix A depict stark differences between the proportion of respondents who voted in either homeland or receiving-country elections, multivariate analysis of the odds of voting while accounting for individual and contextual factors reveals a different story. Model 2 tests whether voting in the most recent receiving-country elections increases or decreases the log-odds of voting in the last homeland elections. Once again, there is a negative association between time spent in the receiving country and homeland voting, as there is between inclusive national and city-level integration policies and political opportunity structures (see Model 2, Table 2 ). However, the introduction of immigrants' voting behaviour in the receiving country offers new insights into the hypothesized relationships between political incorporation and transnational politics. The results indicate that eligible immigrants who voted in the last receiving-country elections are more than twice as likely (exp(0.903)) to have voted in their last homeland elections when compared with eligible immigrants who did not vote in the last receiving-country elections. In addition, immigrants who are ineligible to vote in the receiving country are associated with 2.15 (exp(0.767)) greater odds of having voted in their last homeland elections. These findings appear to challenge H1 and support H2, suggesting that voting in receiving-country elections may increase immigrant propensities to vote in homeland elections. These findings also suggest that immigrants who are unable to participate in receiving-country elections may choose to vote and participate in homeland politics. Like Model 1, Model 2 controls for the overall receiving-country context and political opportunity structure in the various European cities. Yet, the models presented thus far do not account for the potential effects of homeland contexts.
Model 3 introduces a set of fixed-effect dummy variables to capture variation and latent factors in the various immigrant homeland countries in the sample. The introduction of homeland contexts does not appear to alter the previously observed effects of years since arrival, associational membership or voting in the last receiving-country elections (see Table 2 ). However, one noteworthy change in Model 3 is the statistical non-significance of national and city-level integration policies and opportunity structures. This suggests that variation across countries of origin may be a better predictor of immigrant homeland voting than integration policies and contexts of reception. Results for the homeland dummy variables reveal additional insights into how contexts in the country of origin shape transnational politics. Results in Model 3 compare the odds of voting in homeland elections for all groups in comparison with the largest group in the sample -Ecuadorian immigrants. The results indicate that Peruvian immigrants are seven times more likely (exp(1.962)) than Ecuadorians to have voted in their last homeland elections. At the same time, Egyptian and Moroccan immigrants from more autocratic countries of origin are less likely than Ecuadorians to have voted in homeland elections. In other words, immigrant homelands that are keen to democratize and integrate their diaspora populations living abroad may increase transnational political engagement by creating inclusive institutional environments that promote voting from abroad. Conversely, emigrant populations from less democratic homeland countries who recognize the futility of their votes may be less likely to participate in homeland politics from afar. While the introduction of homeland fixed-effect dummy variables captures general variation across immigrant groups, the measures do not reveal which contextual factors in the country of origin specifically increase or decrease the odds of homeland voting.
The fourth and final model (Model 4) replaces country of origin dummy variables with a set of substantive origin-country fixed effects. The results suggest that voter turnout in homeland elections increases the odds of having voted from abroad in the most recent homeland elections by 1.03 (exp(0.029)). Unsurprisingly, the single strongest origin-country contextual factor is whether external voting is allowed. All things being equal, the presence of external voting policies increases the odds of having voted in the most recent elections in the country of origin by 1.70 (exp(0.532) ). While the finding that external voting policies increase the odds of participating in homeland elections runs the risk of tautology, it also suggests that recent diasporic engagement by homeland governments may increase transnational political engagement if immigrants trust the democratic processes and governance of their countries of origin.
Post-colonial migrants are also associated with 1.72 (exp(0.540)) greater odds of voting in recent homeland elections, suggesting that historical colonial ties between countries of origin and settlement may foster transnational political participation in homeland elections among immigrants residing in the cities of a former colonial power (for example, Spain or Britain). Finally, there is a negative association between the distance from the capital of the country of origin and the immigrants' cities of residence in Europe. As the distance between the capital of the country of origin and the city of residence in the receiving country increases, the odds of voting in the most recent homeland elections decrease by 1.11 (exp(-0.107) ). In sum, both the addition of fixed-effect dummy variables (Model 3) and substantive country-of-origin fixed-effect variables (Model 4) offer new empirical insights into the ways in which homeland contexts can mediate immigrants' transnational political engagement. However, since the presentation of log-odds and odds ratios can be difficult to interpret substantively, I calculate predicted probabilities from Model 4 to further illustrate the effects of the key independent variables on the probability of having voted in the last country-of-origin elections. Table 3 presents these results. Table 3 . All other covariates controlled at their means.
Consistent with the resocialization perspective and H1, time spent in the receiving country as measured by years following the first arrival appears to decrease the probability of having voted in the last homeland elections. Figure A graphically depicts this negative relationship by showing that each additional year following arrival in the receiving country is associated with a lower probability of homeland voting. The predicted probability of having voted in the origin country is 0.28 for immigrants who have been in the receiving country for approximately five years and 0.14 for immigrants who have been in the receiving country for fifteen years (see Table 3 ). Yet, the remaining key indicators of civic and political participation appear to have the opposite effect and offer support for H2 and the complementarity perspective.
Figure 1: Predicted probability of origin-country voting by years since arrival
The predicted probability of having voted in the last homeland elections is 0.40 for immigrants who voted in the last receiving-country elections. Thus, immigrants who voted in the last receiving-country elections have a 21 per cent higher probability of having voted in the last homeland elections (see Table 3 ). In addition, immigrants denied access to receiving-country elections through ineligibility have a predicted probability of 0.22 for voting in the most recent homeland elections. Furthermore, immigrants with associational memberships in the receiving country are 8 per cent more likely to have voted in the last homeland elections. Finally, the presence of external voting policies in the country of origin increases the probability of having voted in the last homeland elections by 8 per cent. In sum, while time spent in the receiving country generally decreases the probability of voting in the last homeland elections, measures of civic and political participation as well as institutional access to homeland voting from abroad appear to increase the probability of transnational political engagement for immigrants who have the resources to engage in homeland politics.
Discussion and conclusion
While the preceding analysis fails to offer definitive causal explanations for why immigrants might vote from abroad in homeland elections, the observed associations offer comparative insights into the relationship between immigrants' receiving-country and homeland-oriented voting behaviour. In addition, the present analysis offers novel insights into the overall impact of receiving-country and homeland contexts on immigrant proclivities to participate in homeland electoral politics. Yet, the analysis does not definitively support one perspective over the other. Consistent with the resocialization perspective, as time spent in the receiving country increases, immigrants become less likely to have voted in the most recent elections in their countries of originechoing the conclusions of earlier research on Latin American immigrants in the USA (Morawska 2014; Soehl and Waldinger 2012; Waldinger 2008 ).
Yet, findings also support the complementarity perspective insomuch as immigrants who voted in the last receiving-country elections are twice as likely to have voted in the last elections in their countries of origin. Furthermore, immigrants who are ineligible to vote in the receiving country are also more likely to have voted in the homeland elections. This suggests that, if immigrants are motivated to activate their electoral political voice, they may do so in both receiving and origin countries. This is apparent from descriptive statistics showing that immigrants from countries lacking external voting rights (such as Chile, India and Bangladesh) tend to show higher rates of voting in the most recent receiving-country elections. Moreover, the group with the greatest likelihood of voting in homeland elections (Peruvians) also has the fourth largest proportion of respondents voting in the last receiving-country elections. In other words, a degree of complementarity may exist between receiving and origin-country voting among a select group of immigrants who are motivated and able to activate their political voice.
Individual resources and complementarity
Individual resources undoubtedly determine immigrant propensities to engage in homeland electoral politics (Guarnizo et al. 2003; Lafleur 2015) . Both the motivations and capacities for immigrants to participate in electoral politics are paramount for understanding the observed complementarity between receiving-country and homeland voting. The findings suggest that educated, older, currently employed immigrants are more likely to participate in transnational politics, signalling a possible selection effect among immigrants most likely to vote in homeland elections. However, individual resources do not exclusively determine the observed complementarity between voting in the receiving country and the homeland. Rather, immigrants motivated to exercise their political voices may be more likely to use their resources to participate in elections both 'here' and 'there' with a view to improving their lives in both places of origin and settlement. Thus, the observed complementarity between immigrant voting in the receiving country and the homeland appears to challenge the central premise of the resocialization perspective.
If voting serves as a culminating form of political integration and the embodiment of citizenship and national identity (Gordon 1964; Heath et al. 2013; Ramakrishnan 2005) , my findings suggest that immigrants may not always choose between competing political loyalties. Rather, those who seek to participate in electoral politics may do so if they are eligible to vote, regardless of whether the elections take place in the receiving or origin country. While this finding does not detract from the empirical evidence presented here and elsewhere of political resocialization and declining transnational political engagement among immigrants over time (Waldinger 2015) , it does suggest that civic and political incorporation into a receiving society does not necessarily require disengagement from homeland politics. Indeed, the findings appear to suggest that the nature of the relationship between political integration and transnational political engagement may ultimately be complementary among politically motivated immigrants with the resources and abilities to engage in electoral politics 'here' and 'there'.
Receiving-country contexts
With respect to the contextual dimensions of transnational politics, the findings offer useful insights into how some features of receiving and origin countries shape homeland-oriented politics. Inclusive and accessible national and local political opportunity structures in receiving societies appear to decrease the odds of voting in homeland elections. This is consistent with previous studies that find that receiving societies with inclusive attitudes towards immigrants, such as those that promote multiculturalism, have lower levels of immigrant transnationalism and homeland-oriented political claims-making (Chaudhary and Guarnizo 2016; Koopmans et al. 2005) . In addition, the negative association between inclusive integration policies and homelandoriented politics could signify that immigrants are more likely to disengage from their homelands when they find themselves in open receiving societies with proactive integration policies. A more thorough analysis of the effects of multiculturalism on transnational electoral politics could yield additional insights but alas, this is beyond the scope of the present study. To understand better how and why more inclusive receiving societies might constrain immigrant transnational political activity would require additional research. At the same time, the observed negative association between inclusive political opportunity structures and transnational electoral politics warrants a degree of caution. While an open and accessible political opportunity structure may reduce immigrants' proclivities to vote in homeland elections, it may not decrease other forms of non-electoral transnational politics facilitated by advocacy organizations or protest movements (Kastoryano and Schader 2014; Koinova 2013) . Therefore, there is a need for additional research into how receiving-country integration policies and opportunity structures influence homeland-oriented electoral and non-electoral politics.
Country of origin contexts
I find that immigrants from countries with active diaspora engagement policies (for example, Peru or Ecuador) are more likely to vote in homeland elections. Conversely, immigrants from less democratic countries with autocratic leaders (for example, Egypt or Morocco) are predictably, unlikely to engage in homeland politics from abroad. More specifically, Peruvian immigrants are the most likely to have voted in their homeland's last elections, for which many contextual factors could be responsible. Like the diaspora engagement policies developed in Ecuador and other Latin American countries (Boccagni 2014; Escobar 2015; Morales and Pilati 2014) , the Peruvian government has sought to cultivate and recognize that its growing diaspora represents a symbolic 'fifth region' of the country (Berg and Tamagno 2006) . By encouraging dual citizenship, external voting and special legislative offices for emigrants, the Peruvian government tries to attract migrant remittances through fostering a sense of loyalty and belonging to Peru. Hence, the Peruvian government's mandatory voting laws, which require all citizens between the ages of 18 and 70 to vote irrespective of whether they reside in Peru, could explain the Peruvian immigrants' tendency to vote (Berg and Tamagno 2006) . Unfortunately, the data used in the present analysis do not allow me to determine whether perceptions of belonging or mandatory legal obligations motivate Peruvian migrants to engage in homeland politics. Nonetheless, efforts by the country of origin to foster transnational linkages must surely increase the potential for homeland politics from afar by developing the appropriate policies and infrastructures to facilitate long-distance voting. However, the mere presence of diaspora engagement policies does not fully explain the variation in immigrants' homeland voting, as observed in the case of Colombian immigrants.
The Colombian government has longstanding policies designed to cultivate and engage its diaspora abroad with external voting rights dating back to the 1960s (Escobar 2015) . However, more than two decades of conflict, instability, and foreign interference in the Colombian government's internal affairs, have seen high levels of corruption and mistrust in the country's governance among Colombians living abroad . So, despite the presence of policies to encourage diasporic engagement and external voting, the political culture in Colombia may explain why Colombians living abroad are not particularly keen to vote in their homeland elections. Thus, the overall level of stability and trust in a country's governance may be as important as diasporic engagement when seeking to increase emigrant participation in homeland politics. Future research should investigate how previous or current conflicts, along with government corruption, influence the overall transnational political engagement of immigrants living abroad.
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Moving beyond external voting and policies to engage the diaspora, my findings also reveal that a high voter turnout in the country of origin may increase the odds of voting in homeland elections. This suggests that when more people participate in electoral politics in the country of origin, immigrants may be more likely to engage in homeland politics from abroad. Voter turnout may partially capture the pre-migration political culture insomuch as migrants who come from countries with elevated levels of democratic participation may be more likely to have participated in politics before they emigrated. Furthermore, the observed positive effect of post-colonial ties on voting in the country of origin suggests that historical colonial ties may generate a degree of shared cultural understandings, thus ultimately increasing the political integration of post-colonial immigrants in receiving societies such as Spain and the UK (Heath et al. 2013; Hierro 2016) . Accordingly, post-colonial ties and voter turnout in countries of origin may constitute a type of pre-migration political socialization that immigrants bring to their new receiving societies. In sum, post-colonial immigrants from countries of origin with external voting policies and high voter turnout may experience a simultaneous political socialization in which their positions in multiple political fields expose them to different ideas about governance, citizenship, rights and responsibilities, thus enabling them to engage in the politics of their receiving and homeland societies. This pre-migration political socialization, coupled with a political resocialization in the receiving country, may generate a degree of complementarity in the political engagement of immigrants who have both the resources and motivations to vote 'here' and 'there'.
I accessed external voting data from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance, available at: www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voting-abroad. 8. The Polity IV scores assigned to the countries of origin coincide with the year of the latest elections in which migrants could have voted while living abroad. 9. Unfortunately, a detailed analysis of corruption and mistrust in the countries of origin is beyond the scope of this article.
